1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
2	WESTERN DIVISION
3	MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC., Case No. 3:08CV1434 Toledo, Ohio
4	Plaintiffs, April 6, 2011 10:00 a.m.
5	-vs-
6	ANDREA L. BRENT, et al.,
7	Defendants.
8	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID A. KATZ
9	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
10	APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff: Theodore W. Seitz
11	Dykema Gossett 201 Townsend Street
12	Lansing, Michigan 48933 (517) 374-9100
13	For Defendant: Donna Jean Evans
14	Murray and Murray  111 East Shoreline Drive
15	Sandusky, Ohio 44870 (419) 624-3000
16	For Intervenors: Reginald Jackson, Jr.
17	Adam S. Nightingale  Connely, Jackson & Collier
18	405 Madison Avenue, Suite 1600 Toledo, Ohio 43604
19	(419) 243-7119
20	Leonard A. Bennett Matthew J. Erausquin
21	Consumer Litigation Associates 1800 Diagonal Road, Suite 600
22	Alexandria, Virginia 22314 (702) 273-7770
23	Court Reporter: Judith A. Gage, RMR-CRR
24	(216) 357-7238
25	Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography. Transcript produced by computer-aided transcription.

1 PROCEEDINGS 2 THE COURT: I presume we have a court 3 4 reporter? THE CLERK: Yes, sir, we do. 5 6 THE COURT: I think everyone should identify 7 themselves for the record, please. Since the movants will go first, I'd appreciate it if they would identify 8 themselves for the court reporter. 9 MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, my name is Leonard 10 11 Bennett. I'm at the podium here at the mike at our 12 counsel desk. We don't have the ability to see Your Honor, but --13 14 THE COURT: No great loss. 15 MR. BENNETT: Yes, sir. I'm here together 16 with co-counsel with my law firm, Matthew Erausgin, who is in our Alexandria office, and Susan Rotkis in our 17 Newport News office. We are in the Court, it is a 18 classic wood panel courtroom. Your camera has myself 19 20 and the local Midland counsel. You cannot see us in 21 the camera, but we are off to what would be your, I 22 quess, right, my left at our counsel table. But 23 otherwise, it is a typical environment, I suspect, Your 2.4 Honor.

THE COURT: Very good. And I presume there

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are in Toledo a group of folks gathered?
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                MR. SEITZ: Yes, Your Honor. Ted Seitz
      appearing on behalf of the defendants Midland Funding
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      and Midland Credit Management.
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                THE COURT: You will have to approach the
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      podium.
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                MR. SEITZ: I apologize, Your Honor.
                                                      Ted
      Seitz on behalf of Midland Credit Management and
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      Midland Funding. I am here with Donna Evans on behalf
      of the plaintiffs. In addition, Mr. Jackson is also
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      here on behalf of Rubio and James, along with
      Mr. Nightingale as well.
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                THE COURT: I hope the sound is coming
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      through better.
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                MS. EVANS: I don't think it is, Your Honor.
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                MR. SEITZ: We are getting feedback here.
                THE COURT: Very good. All right. What is
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      the request of time allocation from the moving party?
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                MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, having grown up as
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      a lawyer in the Eastern District of Virginia, I suspect
      that we would be comfortable with ten minutes.
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      Certainly Your Honor has had an opportunity to review
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      our pleading, but I don't believe that I would
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      necessarily need to restate all of those arguments.
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                THE COURT: All right. I assumed that I
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would give you at least 20 minutes, of which you can reserve a portion for rebuttal.

MR. BENNETT: Thank you, Judge. I would like to reserve half of that for rebuttal.

THE COURT: Very good. Please proceed.

MR. BENNETT: Thank you, Your Honor. Judge, we are here and you are there on behalf of two groups of individuals. The first are two individuals that we allege we represent that have opted out of the litigation in Ohio. Those were Rubio and James, and they present the argument that it is valid to opt out, their opt-outs are legal.

And in fact, the law in the Sixth Circuit, the law in this country is that the Court has jurisdiction over consumers or over parties in a class, class members who are not present in Ohio and who otherwise have not been in contact in Ohio only upon the failure to opt out. That is, it is sort of an assumed consent to jurisdiction. If a plaintiff or class member does not opt out, then they are presumed to consent to jurisdiction, and the minimum contact concerns, the process concerns are in part applicable.

And the law in this regard, Your Honor, is not controversial, and I recognize that you have disparate briefs but conflicting briefs. There is no

court that has ruled that you can have jurisdiction in a money damages class action, that is, one under Rule 23(b)(3), without the minimal contact or the inferred consent of the opt-out.

Certainly Miss Rubio and Mr. James, Mr. James is an identity theft victim that wants to go to court immediately to have this judgment he just discovered vacated and renew his credit. Miss Rubio has been in litigation long before Your Honor's case turned into a national class in February, and both have exercised their right to opt out.

As just a brief aside, Your Honor, we have filed a declaration, an extraordinary filing that normally would have been done based on -- and I understand that these were not intended to disparage us, but the accusation had been made in briefing by the Plaintiff that we had manipulated the opt-outs. The insinuation that was had mailed them, that we had checked boxes and filled them out, which certainly is false, and I have sworn not simply as an officer of the Court but under penalty of perjury that that is not the case.

Mr. James' opt-out has been attached. It was mailed and he received the information that was provided to Mr. Murray. They seek through proceedings

to recover their own financial lives, correct their credit, go to court, and obtain relief.

We had briefed the issue at length in our memo. At the Court's initial telephone conference, it appeared to us that Your Honor's direction for that issue was whether or not you could continue to pursue claims after opting out or after the settlement in general if you have opted out, that were otherwise to be released, and the defendant has not argued that position, nor do I think they can.

We briefed it -- an opt out, from the litigation in the other venue. On behalf of -- the defendant also makes the argument as to Rubio and James, Your Honor, that you are not allowed to opt out until the opt-out period closes. There is no law on that to the contrary. The law is that you cannot enjoin a class member [inaudible] because you cannot presume that minimal contact is happening, so there is nothing, there is no evidence, Your Honor, other than the assertions of Midland that we would just rush in for a settlement, Your Honor, as the opt-outs continue to and seek to proceed.

And the only other instance in which we were able to find a case in which an injunction was granted during the required final approval of the closing and

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opt-out is where there was evidence that it was impossible for the parties in the litigation in the settling venue to put together the settlement. They didn't have the resources because there were, you know, a large number of other cases that were going to trial and litigation.

In this instance, Midland has a totally separate defense team. They have not had any interaction in this case prior to this process now with the folks you are dealing with in Ohio.

The second, Judge, we also made the arguments on behalf of objector in the motion to intervene. The defendant has not contested that, Mr. Herring. tolling issue is significant, and we raised it. two biggest issues is, number one, we simply ask that the injunction be modified so that claims are tolled to the same degree that claims are enjoined, and the law in your circuit, the law nationally, is the same. your circuit, Wyser-Pratte, a Sixth Circuit case was cited, as well as Northern District of Ohio case In Re Vertrue Marketing, both of which say, respectively, first, that the party that is not in the, in the class case, for example, the debt collectors here in Virginia, the debt collectors in California or Washington, they, you cannot enjoin those individual

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defendants because they, you cannot toll claims against them. They are not present in your court. You don't have jurisdiction over them.

So, we seek to clarify that not just that, that in those instances, because you are unable to affect tolling as to those nonparties, the non Encore, non Midland parties, that you allow us to clarify this injunction, that it does not enjoin us and others from pursuing those claims, and secondly, Judge, the law in your district, the law nationally, the In Re Vertrue Marketing case in the Northern District of Ohio says that if a claim is not pled, it is not tolled. And in this instance, the only claim we have pled is an Ohio-based Fair Collection Debt Practices Act claim, and there are a large number of other claims that are not tolled and there is no pleading that alleged a national class, and that, Your Honor, can cure, despite Midland rejecting your offer and our offer of agreeing to toll during the pendency of the settlement process.

We ask that Your Honor enforce that and amend the injunction so that all the claims that have been tolled -- or enjoined, rather, are also tolled, and I would certainly be happy to answer any question Your Honor may have.

THE COURT: Well, I do have a couple

questions. With respect to the opting out, it seems to me that under Rule 20 -- God, I hear myself coming back.

23(c)(2) and under Newberg that was written on class actions, the notice must be mailed and received by the person seeking to opt out before an opt-out can be recognized as effective, and the reason for that is because until receipt of the notice, the individual does not have the ability to make a reasoned judgment because the notice contains that upon which he or she relies to be covered as part of the class, or to opt out. Therefore, until the date of mailing, I cannot see how under 23(c)(2) the opting out would be effective.

MR. BENNETT: First, Your Honor, respectfully, I strongly disagree, that the language of 23(c)(2) does not say this. It just simply says the notice requires that you inform your consumer of the opt out, and if you were to take this the other direction and look at basic concepts of fairness, the defendant has succeeded in enjoining our clients by sending an email letter and copies of the settlement to our clients by us as their counsel and has obtained the benefit of an injunction that of course we have alleged is not effective until the opt-out process is over, but

the defendant in this court has held otherwise in the order that Your Honor signed.

The effect is that you would be permitting notice to be made by counsel to counsel, but you would require that our client sit there and stare at their mailboxes.

Candidly, Judge, there would be significant efforts made to explain to Your Honor why the mail process itself is a very bad idea by a number of objectors in separate matters, separate pleadings.

THE COURT: I beg your pardon? Would you repeat that?

MR. BENNETT: Yes, Judge. We have not substantively challenged the settlement in the current motion. We are simply asking Your Honor to preserve the status quo, that's what we are trying to do, while the objectors have an opportunity to present to Your Honor their arguments, their evidence, and the law with respect to even whether the notice should go out.

For example, in the Makson versus Portfolio Recovery case, Portfolio Recovery being one of Midland's primary debt buyer rivals, that case settled in our district here about two years ago and it also dealt with the affidavits and pleadings that PRA was filing with the Virginia state court, and the concern

that we had was that you would be sending out a notice to consumers that debtors, that this defendant currently in Virginia -- I don't know how it is outside of Virginia -- is currently continuing all of its garnishment and levying and debtor interrogatory efforts collecting against these class members right now as we speak, and you would be sending a notice to them saying Midland is sending you notice, a court notice so that you can fill out information and confirm your identity and send it back for the possibility at most of a ten dollar check.

It is a common practice of debt collectors to send small checks to debtors so that they can get their bank account information and their credit information, their personal information. It is the most effective skip trace in the world.

And so you will receive testimony from some of the top debt collector defense experts who will provide you the explanation or analysis that it is a disaster to send notices out to these unrepresented, in most instances, consumers that Midland will have full access to at the same time they are continuing to try to collect.

And so people make arguments; that is one of a number of arguments that are shortly forthcoming from

the National Consumer Law Center, from the National 1 2 Association of Consumer Advocates, board members that represent clients in a variety of contexts. 3 THE COURT: I'm obviously non plussed by that 4 argument because you did it. To the bottom of the 5 6 argument, you are saying class actions cannot be 7 effective. You cannot send out notices. MR. BENNETT: No, sir. 8 THE COURT: If that's true, no class action 9 would be resolvable. 10 11 MR. BENNETT: For example, in the Makson case, Judge, we included in our order a prohibition 12 such that the defendant debt collector would have no 13 14 access to any of the data. It would not know which 15 consumers were active, it would not know their current 16 addresses, and it could not use any of that information for debt collection. And certainly we have settled, 17 and this is not as an objector, but in most 18 circumstances we are consumer class action counsel, and 19 20 so that --21 THE COURT: Do you notice where these returns are to go? They don't go to Midland, as I recall. 22 23 MR. BENNETT: It would go to a class administrator that Midland has full access to, and that 24

is ordinary. In most circumstances, the defendant is

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not adverse to the class members any longer. instance it is different, because you have a debt collector with judgments against the lion's share of these folks, and is continuing to this moment, to this day, to garnish and to levy and to file adversary pleadings and collection pleadings against these class members, and to suggest, Judge, getting back to the question that it should be significant, even though it is not in Rule 23 and there is no case law on this, that it should be significant that our clients, by the way, all of whom are represented, all of whom have counsel, that you should facilitate a means by which this debt collector should circumvent that, to be able to have the direct contact with the represented consumer debtors who have been sued in the past by Midland, and force them to go through this exercise twice is unjust.

The purpose of the process is to protect the class member. That's the purpose. That's the only purpose of the Rule 23 approval process, is to make sure that as a fiduciary, in the interest of the class members, that this settlement and the whole process leading up to it is fair, and we represent individuals, Judge, who have selected and asked us to represent them. The opt-outs that have been sent through

Mr. Murray have been mailed by each class member. 1 2 have my sworn testimony as to that --THE COURT: I understand. Let me interrupt 3 you there. 4 Of those that I have seen, at the top of each 5 is the name with the same writing. The exact same 6 7 writing. Additionally, some have both boxes, opting 8 in, opting out, remaining as checked, and one at least, 9 10 Morrow, has only the opt-in -- I use that, my own 11 term --MR. BENNETT: Yes, sir. That certainly 12 13 confirms the process that I outlined in our 14 declaration, that we sent these, our clients, we sent 15 them a copy of the settlement agreement with the notice 16 and this form, with an instruction that they could choose to opt out. Some have elected not to opt out, 17 and that is not unexpected. 18 THE COURT: But some have done both. 19 20 MR. BENNETT: And some have done both, and 21 certainly I think that there is legitimate concern about the message that those who are checking those 22 23 boxes are conveying, but that is not Mr. James and that 24 is not the vast majority. It is one percent of all the

individual opt-outs, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Let's move on. I want to ask you about tolling.

MR. BENNETT: Yes. sir.

THE COURT: I want you to comment on the Wyeth case in the Eastern District Virginia last year,  $Torkie\ Tork\ v\ Wyeth$ .

It would seem to me that that case permits class action tolling because parallel state claims would be tolled under Virginia law. I would then have no occasion to seek whether particular Virginia claims would be tolled under the present process, and I would therefore have no need to amend the injunction language.

MR. BENNETT: Judge, to the extent that -well, first, American Pipe and Crown Cork, and Your
Honor, the Northern District of Ohio's decision in
In Re Vertrue, all say that this pertains to a unity of
parties and claims, and the rule -- and it is a
relation back under a Rule 15 analysis -- is that to
the extent that the defendant had notice of the, that
is, a future defendant, a defendant that sued in the
future. If the defendant had notice of the claim and
notice of the magnitude of the claim, then it is
tolled, and so there is a -- a pleading at some future
point that would file the action. Midland would say

your statute of limitations is expired, and we would say, well, this claim was related to, it was a Virginia conspiracy claim or an abuse of process claim under State law and it was related to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim, and there is a couple significant problems with that process.

Number one is it means there is uncertainty, and in the future there is the possibility that our claims are tolled, even for that subcategory.

Importantly, all of the tolling analysis assumes that you have a unity of parties in the pleading, and normally what is done, Your Honor, when a class action settlement occurs, is you almost always have an amended complaint that is filed that redefines the class, and that is what would have been necessary and could still be done, an amended complaint that changes the Ohio Fair Debt Collection Practices Act to a national class.

Beyond that, you also have difficulty, because there are claims that are not directly related, but might -- that is, the defendant would argue that they are not exactly the same, such as an abuse of process claim or such as a civil conspiracy, or the case of the identity theft victim and the credit reporting issues that are still related in part, based on the breadth of Your Honor's injunction to that, so

we are simply asking, and there has not been an 1 2 argument made by the other side, and Your Honor is known for your fairness on all accounts, we are asking 3 for a fair outcome which simply doesn't prejudice 4 5 anybody. 6 It is, Your Honor, amend the injunction to 7 clarify that all claims by all national class members with respect to Encore and Midland companies are 8 tolled, and there is no fair opposition to that. 9 10 And if it is true, as Your Honor suggests, 11 and as Midland or the plaintiff notes in simply a footnote, that the state claims are tolled, then there 12 is no prejudice to anybody. I simply clarify the 13 order. We are not -- this is not an overreach at all, 14 15 Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: I understand now where you are 17 coming from. MR. BENNETT: And Judge, it also doesn't 18 pertain, respectfully, regardless, you cannot toll 19 20 claims. You don't have the jurisdiction, 21 unfortunately, because that would be a simple fix. You don't have the jurisdiction over 22 23 non Encore parties in both the Washington and California cases, and in our other cases that would be 24 25 filed with Mr. James, we would bring action against the

debt collector bills in the State of Virginia that had 1 2 no connection to Encore Midland. You don't have jurisdiction over those non parties at all. They are 3 not a family member of Encore, and so you don't have 4 the ability to toll. The way the injunction is 5 written, it certainly --6 7 THE COURT: Why would you ever interpret the injunction to reach non party defendants? 8 9 MR. BENNETT: The injunction says you cannot 10 file any action anywhere against anyone based on the 11 affidavits, and in fact, we think that Encore Midland is violating its own injunction by continuing to 12 garnish and to levy class members during the pendency 13 of this injunction, but it is very wrong. And I 14 15 understand Your Honor did not draft it but it is Your 16 Honor's words, and we are asking now that you clarify. Again, if that's the case, then there is no prejudice 17 or harm by simply confirming in an order that it does 18 not pertain to those non parties. 19 20 You have a similar confusion coming from the 21 Attorney General of Minnesota. I think that there will be other Attorneys General that, as I understand, 22 23 will --THE COURT: Are those criminal matters? 24 25 MR. BENNETT: The matter of the State

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Attorney General in Minnesota is not at all a criminal
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      matter, Judge. It is as well a civil matter.
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                THE COURT:
                            Thank you.
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                MR. BENNETT: Thank you, Judge.
                THE COURT: Mr. Seitz.
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                MR. SEITZ: Thank you, Your Honor. Let me
      move towards the podium here. I will be brief, Your
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      Honor, but I do want to remind the Court and maybe some
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      of the --
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                THE COURT: Before you start, I want to find
      out if Judge Lauck is in the courtroom.
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                Can you hear me? I just want to say hello,
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      and thank you very much. (Inaudible.)
                MR. SEITZ: Do you want me to go forward,
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      Your Honor?
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                THE COURT: Yes.
                MR. SEITZ: Your Honor, I just wanted to
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      remind some of the parties in Virginia and other places
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      that what is really in front of the Court as far as the
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      cases, because I hear a lot of statements from Virginia
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      counsel about how --
                THE COURT: If Mr. Seitz is speaking, I
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      cannot hear him.
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                THE CLERK: They have us muted on the bridge.
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      I sent an E-mail.
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MR. BENNETT: It seems like the other site is
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      muted.
                THE COURT: David, you might check and see if
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      your site is muted.
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                IT TECH: If it is muted, it is being done by
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      the bridge. The courtroom is not muted.
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                (Pause.)
                THE CLERK: I think we reestablished. Looks
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      like we may be unmuted now.
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                MR. SEITZ: Your Honor, can you hear me?
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                THE COURT: Yes.
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                MR. SEITZ: It appears after this long
      arduous case, Your Honor, I finally have been muted for
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      a while.
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                THE COURT: I can only hear every other word.
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                IT TECH: I have no answer.
                MR. SEITZ: Do we want to take maybe five --
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                IT TECH: Talk slow, into the microphone.
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                MR. SEITZ: Your Honor, can you hear me now?
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                THE COURT: Yes.
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                MR. SEITZ: I will talk slow, and if I move
      too fast, please remind me.
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                I just wanted to start off by reminding the
      Court and the counsel in Virginia, they may not be
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      aware or sensitive to the fact, they mentioned in their
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argument to start off that this was an Ohio-based class, and while Brent was an Ohio-based class, as the Court is aware, the Vassalle cases and the Franklin cases have always been pled as national class actions, and they are part of this settlement as well. The other thing that I wanted to remind the parties about is this is not only a (b)(3) settlement, this is also a (b)(2) injunctive relief settlement as well.

So where I would like to start out is the opt-out notice being effective, and clearly our view, Your Honor, which I know is supported by law, is that the opt-out that Miss Rubio and the other 55 people have submitted is not effective, and in fact, Mr, Bennett's own declaration supports why they are not effective when he states that for those that are marked both with, as you call it, Judge, the opt-in and the opt-out boxes checked, even by his own admission there would need to be some other follow-up or clarification or affidavit from those people as to what they meant by their notice.

This only underscores the importance of why the notice process has to be followed in such a rigorous manner, that it must be mailed out in a neutral forum, then received by the class members, and at that point they can go to counsel, other counsel,

and ask questions and ask advice on whether they should opt in or opt out, or whether they should object to the settlement, but until that time, until they receive it, it is not effective, and this is in the cases that we point out to the Court in our brief, and in addition, I found another case which I did not have a chance to put in our brief of which I know Mr. Bennett is familiar with, and it is a case out of the Central District of California called White versus Experian Information Solutions, and the cite is 2009 Westlaw 4267843.

There have been a series of opinions in the case, and the opinion I have is dated November 23, 2009. It talks about a situation where competing counsel, a counsel that had objection to the settlement, had sent out a competing notice, as the Court called it, and tried to reach out to class members, and the Court said, "The class members' decision whether or not to opt out is a matter of extreme importance, committed to the discretion of the Court, not the litigants, and therefore a neutral notice is sent to the parties. A party sending out its own competing, argumentative notice and invitation to the class members to opt out defeats the purpose of the Court insuring that class members receive a neutral notice."

In this case, as per Mr. Bennett's own 1 2 declaration that he submitted yesterday, he mentions in Paragraph 14, "We began to counsel our clients they 3 needed to either opt out or object," and this is when 4 they sent out that proposed notice form that was a 5 6 preliminary approval order along with the other 7 documents that he says were submitted, and so in that case, Judge, I would say this is actually a competing 8 It is not neutral when he sends it out. 9 notice. 10 These people need to receive neutral notice 11 in the format that the Court has set forth in order for any opt-out to ever be effective, so --12 13 THE COURT: Excuse me. Excuse me. I don't get double or triple pay for this torture, and I don't 14 15 mean what you are saying, but it is coming across 16 triple times. I have my right arm and my brain on this 17 matter. Now, would you speak, and don't take this for 18 the record until I tell you. Do some speaking, would 19 20 you please, Ted? (Discussion off the record.) 21 THE COURT: Back on the record. 22 23 MR. SEITZ: We'll try it again, Your Honor. 24 As I mentioned before, Judge, in this case, 25 the opt-outs that have been submitted, or alleged

opt-outs, are not effective. The Court needs to wait and the class needs to wait for this notice to be mailed out and then for valid opt-outs to be submitted.

And the other thing I wanted to mention, Your Honor, which I think the Court has a clear view of, is that if claims are tolled and you have the power to toll it, pursuant to the *Torkie* case, which the Court pointed out and which we also had attached to our brief, in addition, I would like to note that under Virginia law, Section 801-229(c), the statute of limitations is tolled by an injunction. So while the Court's injunction is effective in this case, claims related to affidavits of the class members are tolled. If the claims are not related to the affidavits, then Your Honor, they are not tolled, and I want to make sure that we're clear on that point.

If what Mr. Bennett suggested was to amend the injunction so that any and all potential claims against Midland are tolled while it is pending, I don't think that is correct, Your Honor, especially if that would include non class members. They can interpret what that means.

So if it is related to an affidavit, the claim is tolled. I think that that is clear. Once the injunction is gone and the class settlement has been

approved and the opt-outs are effective, then those 1 2 people who have opted out as to those claims are free to do so. Their claims have been tolled while the 3 class action, while the injunction was pending. 4 THE COURT: Let's go off the record for a 5 6 moment, please. 7 (Discussion off the record.) MR. BENNETT: The Judge had another matter 8 she wanted to leave for. She wanted to express to Your 9 Honor her apologies. We confirm that we'll provide a 10 11 copy of the transcript to Judge Lauck. THE COURT: And I will call her this 12 13 afternoon. Thank you. Mr. Seitz, if you would continue. We're back 14 15 on the record. 16 MR. SEITZ: Yes, Your Honor. We have a little bit of an echo here, but I think since the other 17 two locations are fine, we'll just bear it. I think we 18 can do so. 19 20 I guess with that, and what I said last time, 21 before we were cut off, maybe the best thing for me to do is to ask if the Court has any questions or any 22 23 areas it wants me to address. THE COURT: It seems to me that with this 24 25 problem and it being so difficult for me to hear, I'm

going to have to look at the transcript of this and go from there.

With that in mind, I would like to suggest, but not demand, that there be some post-hearing briefing, very short, please, to the point, limited to five pages on each side, unless counsel agrees with one another that ten pages are appropriate.

All right. What I would like Mr. Bennett to touch on are two issues in particular. One, any new light to shed on the tolling issue. Two, requested or suggested language in amending the injunction, and the explanation of why you believe it is appropriate.

It would seem to me that Mr. Bennett would go first, and Ted Seitz would respond. And Donna, if you wish to speak, you may do so, and/or reserve for briefs, whichever you wish.

MS. EVANS: Thank you, Your Honor. I just have a few comments that I would like to make, and for the record, I also wanted to let you know that counsel, class counsel did receive the opt-out form from Gilbert James in our mail Monday. It was postmarked on March 31st. So that form was not in our office at the time the brief was filed.

Class counsel does respect the right of every class member to opt out, if that is their choice. I

want to make that clear. And I think the issue at this point comes down to when the opt-out is valid and when it is timely, as the injunction stated. I believe that that issue has been addressed completely, so I won't go into that any further.

The other thing I wanted to bring out is it seems to me that Mr. Bennett in his oral argument has strayed from the request that he made in his motion. He made two points, first having to do with the opt-out, and second was this Court's jurisdiction to enter the injunction in the first place.

As we stated in our briefs, this Court does have the authority to issue an injunction against third parties in aid of its jurisdiction, and I believe that in this case, with the settlement pending, with the fairness hearing going to be contested, as Mr. Bennett states, he has already filed a motion for one of his -- one of the class members to intervene, and we do expect that he is going to follow through on that, so we will be opposing that motion.

However, as long as the fairness hearing is going to be contested, this Court needs to retain jurisdiction over those absent class members and the opt-outs against any parallel litigation that could produce conflicting results and could cause more

confusion for the class members, especially if the 1 2 litigation would be commenced prior to the actual opt-out date. 3 At that point, I think those are the two 4 issues that I wanted to address with this Court, and I 5 will entertain any questions should you have any. 6 7 THE COURT: Thank you very much. Mr. Bennett, you have the opportunity to 8 respond, briefly, as well as areas covered by briefing. 9 10 MR. BENNETT: Thank you, Judge. And I'll 11 keep it brief. If I could, Your Honor, take the first 12 opportunity to try to elicit from Your Honor a flushing 13 out of the first issue, a new light on the tolling 14 15 issue. 16 I certainly want to brief, given the very targeted sides, to be on point, and is there anything 17 Your Honor can suggest to inform us of the issue 18 that -- beyond the new light on the tolling issue that 19 20 you would suggest for that first point? 21 THE COURT: The only issue that I want you to address is the response to Ted Seitz' assertions with 22 23 regard to that tolling issue, both in the Virginia cases and elsewhere, the cases he cites. If you 24 25 believe you have already covered it, then I will reread your previously-submitted memorandum.

MR. BENNETT: Yes, Judge. I don't believe that we had addressed some of the arguments that were made, and I will address them in the brief.

If I may, then, use my minutes to respond briefly to the arguments that have been made.

THE COURT: Of course.

MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, it was our effort with the targeted filings that were made not to try to advance the position that the objections we made were the substantive objections that I think Your Honor will receive, may make. It was simply to ask for a preservation of the status quo until Your Honor could hear another side to the story, and you have not heard any arguments at all as to what prejudice or harm would befall either parties by the tolling.

In fact, with respect to the opt-outs, Judge, the best way to moot the need to speed ahead with our causes of action with respect to the opt-outs is to make sure that their claims are fully protected, and failing that, and to the extent that everybody agrees, the parties, the opt-outs, the objectors all agree that these claims should and would be tolled, that it should not be a difficult exercise to reduce that.

We will propose an order hopefully this time

around that you will agree with, and I appreciate class counsel's acknowledgement of the importance of the right to opt out in accordance with law and class action guidelines.

Your Honor, the other issue, briefly, there is this case, Wyeth versus Experian, that was discussed, and that was our \$51 million dollar settlement in a consumer credit case in California, and in fact the National Consumer Law Center is also part of that.

In that instance, we defended as class counsel to the Ninth Circuit. The objectors which were part of our group that broke away, they wanted the Court's blessing on a specific letter, and the Court said you can send whatever letter you want, objector, but you cannot get my blessing on it, and the last line of the Court's order was just that. And the Ninth Circuit recently sustained our defense of the Court's order in concluding that nothing about the order prohibited the communications by the objectors to their clients, and that is a method of informing those individuals and those class members who had all opted out.

So, to the extent that Wyeth v Experian and our case are similar, it strongly supports the position

we take, which is that there is not an inhibition to the bar at all on advising your clients, those that we represent as to the settlement, in providing the copies of the documents.

So I appreciate, I know that Your Honor has had a lot of patience. I thank you for setting this up. I would remind Your Honor that Mr. James at least has a statute of limitations that would expire tomorrow, on the 7th, hence the urgency. And while I will do my best to get our briefing out this evening or first thing in the morning, that is a concern and --

THE COURT: I wanted to touch on that. I had thought about that and I mentioned that as a reason for rushing to set this hearing. But I, as much as I would like to, can not rule by tomorrow. It would seem to me that there would be a way to protect Mr. James.

I'm going to say this, and I don't mean it -and not to offend the Court, I'm not talking about the
Judge -- not offend the injunction would be better
said, if you believe that it is necessary for you to
file by the end of the day tomorrow, it would seem to
me that I could say there is no penalty if you were
proven wrong. It is a difficult conundrum, I would
admit.

What say you, Mr. Seitz?

MR. SEITZ: Your Honor, we would be fine with 1 no penalty if Mr. James filed his claim by tomorrow. 2 THE COURT: Yes. I think that's a 3 resolution. I would like to suggest that if you feel 4 that you need to file, we will find other ways to 5 6 address the issue as we move down the road. 7 MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, may I suggest that in that we currently represent 20 individuals who opted 8 out that have statutes of limitation expiring in the 9 10 month of April, what I would suggest is that we would 11 file, not serve, and immediately provide plaintiff's counsel copies of that, in addition to our letter 12 confirming that we are not intending to serve, and that 13 14 would preserve the statute of limitations, as Your 15 Honor suggests, without disrupting Your Honor's 16 settlement, if Midland's concern is founded. THE COURT: Well, the other course which we 17 take up in other matters like this is to make a 18 voluntarily extension of the statute of limitations as 19 20 between your firm and Midland as to the clients you 21 represent, and you and Mr. Seitz are encouraged to explore that. 22 23 MR. BENNETT: Yes, Judge. The one additional

asterisk, the additional grace concern that the clients

we represent have is our read, if we take the broadest

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read of the Court's injunction, which a lawyer with 16
 1
 2
      years in Federal Court without a sanction, like myself,
      you always take the broadest view, and we believe that
 3
      the broad reading of the injunction to bar our clients
 4
      from seeking to vacate their judgments in our state
 5
 6
      collections court or even to defend against the
 7
      garnishments that Midland is engaged in
      (unintelligible) then we would be fine. Your Honor's
 8
      suggestion would get certainly on the record the
 9
10
      Court's belief that the injunction doesn't reach the
11
      vacations of judgments. I believe Your Honor's
12
      suggestion is, would be effective.
13
                THE COURT: Thank you. In the interest of
      completeness, anyone else wish to make any statement at
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15
      this time before we discuss the timing of the briefing?
16
                All right. It would seem to me that by
      Monday next, Mr. Bennett, if you could file your
17
      brief -- is that sufficient?
18
                MR. BENNETT: It will be, Your Honor, yes.
19
20
                THE COURT: And Donna and Ted, if you would
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      by the end of the week -- that is, a week from this
      coming Friday, that will be the 15th, your response.
22
23
                MR. SEITZ: That is fine, Your Honor.
24
                MR. BENNETT:
                              If Your Honor please, we
25
      actually have due on Monday all of our response briefs
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to the multiple Midland briefs, post trial briefs in
 1
 2
      our Midland jury trial in Alabama. Those are due on
               They will require my full time between now and
 3
      then.
 4
                THE COURT: What about -- the only issue is
 5
      the tolling issue that you have to brief. If we are
 6
      getting around that, why don't we say the 18th.
 7
                MR. BENNETT: Yes, sir.
 8
 9
                           That's a week from Monday.
                THE COURT:
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                MR. BENNETT: Yes, sir.
11
                THE COURT: And Ted, the 25th.
12
                MR. SEITZ: That is fine, Your Honor.
                MS. EVANS: That is fine.
13
                THE COURT: Is that all right, Donna?
14
15
                MS. EVANS: Yes, Your Honor.
16
                THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?
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                MR. BENNETT: Just to alert Your Honor, I'm
      certain, I know that at least -- and we're not the one,
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      but you will have significant objection briefing and
19
20
      subject matter jurisdiction being filed from the
21
      Washington group, probably today or tomorrow. I expect
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      you will have similar substantive objections in terms
23
      of court resources that would be coming in Your Honor,
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      in the same period.
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                THE COURT: Let me ask you, let's talk about
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the length of the briefs. Most of us can't say hello
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 2
      and good-bye in five pages.
                MR. BENNETT: Yes, Judge.
 3
                THE COURT: What is your feeling, gentlemen
 4
      and lady, about the length?
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 6
                MR. BENNETT: We will give as much as the
 7
      Court's resources will accommodate. If ten pages is
      the larger of the two options, we ask for ten.
 8
 9
                MR. SEITZ: Ten is fine, Your Honor.
                                                      I think
      we can do it in five. I'm from Michigan. They have a
10
      five page limit for reply briefs. If Mr. Bennett wants
11
      ten, that's fine, he can take ten; I'll take ten, too.
12
                THE COURT: Well, max ten. Thank you very
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             I want to thank everybody for being available.
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15
      I want to thank you, those of the technical staff who
16
      made this possible. Judge Lauck certainly. And we'll
17
      move on from there.
                MR. SEITZ: Thank you, Your Honor.
18
                THE COURT: Thank you.
19
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                MS. EVANS: Thank you, Your Honor.
21
                THE CLERK: Thank you, Judge.
22
23
                (Proceedings concluded at 11:21 a.m.)
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C E R T I F I C A T EI, Judith A. Gage, Federal Official Court Reporter, certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above entitled matter. April 14, 2011